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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the decision-making processes guiding postdisaster infrastructure reconstruction—
concentrating on wastewater, water supply, stormwater and road networks (“horizontal infrastructure”). It draws
on empirical analysis of the postearthquake reconstruction currently underway in Christchurch, New Zealand.
Restoring infrastructure services to provide at least a basic level of essential services after a disaster helps wider
economic recovery. Subsequently, there is pressure to restore infrastructure services to predisaster levels as
quickly as possible. Reconstruction programmes thus commence in highly uncertain decision-making
environments and are reactive to perceived, immediate needs. The extent and nature of the work is later clarified
and re-evaluated as projects progress. This context of postdisaster response presents unique challenges in
terms of design and delivery processes.
The focus of this paper is to address the impact of such institutional and organizational arrangements on
postdisaster reconstruction decisions. It also discusses changes in decision making that occur over time as
needs change. It does this through examining changes in the overall design philosophy and approaches to
prioritization and deferment in the Christchurch case study.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, research into
postdisaster reconstruction has endeavoured to
develop an understanding of the fundamental
elements of best-practice approaches for disaster
recovery. This has contributed to emerging theories
on
housing
reconstruction
(Hayles,
2010);
postdisaster
planning
processes
(Olshansky,
Hopkins, & Johnson, 2012); and discussion of
institutional, regulatory, and financing arrangements
(Fengler, Ihsan, &Kaiser, 2008; Rotimi, 2010). There
has also been a recent focus on the role of donor
organizations in decision making, particularly
international organizations that intervene in
managing a postdisaster situation (Kennedy,
Ashmore, Babister, & Kelman, 2008). Understanding
the reconstruction process from the perspective of
restoring a city’s wastewater, water supply,
stormwater and transport services (collectively
defined here as “horizontal networks”) is an
important yet overlooked aspect of postdisaster
reconstruction. These networks are fundamental to
urban development. Governments around the world
are concerned with the degradation of network
assets and insufficient investment in infrastructure
(e.g., Engineers Australia, 2010; American Society of
Civil Engineers [ASCE], 2013). Postdisaster
reconstruction typically involves significant capital
investment into these networks. While the capital
available may be limited in terms of repairing
damage caused by a disaster, the budget can be

many times greater than the typical annual renewal
and maintenance budget. Decisions on how to
distribute this money have long-term implications for
both the cost of maintaining the infrastructure and
the ability for communities to function and grow.
Understanding the process behind these decisions
will contribute to a better understanding of the
challenges for introducing improvements and acting
upon perceived opportunities for change. The
process is influenced by both the structure of funding
arrangements and the boundaries placed on the
process by which various options are assessed.
These boundaries are influenced by the size and
complexity of recovery efforts, where the damage
caused overwhelms the capacity of existing local
government and new organizational relationships
form to support the recovery.
This paper reviews how infrastructure decisions are
influenced by the institutional (i.e., the policies,
systems, and processes) and organizational
arrangements
associated
with
postdisaster
reconstruction in Christchurch, New Zealand,
following a series of earthquakes that occurred in
2010 and 2011. It presents an initial analysis
associated within an ongoing research project on
decision-making processes directing infrastructure
reconstruction. This analysis is informed by existing
postdisaster reconstruction literature, government
and project information directly related to
Christchurch reconstruction, and an initial phase of
semistructured
interviews
with
professionals
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(primarily engineers) involved in the reconstruction
process in Christchurch. This work was also informed
by the author’s previous experience working as an
engineer in the reconstruction.
The analysis is presented in two parts. It starts with an
overview of the Christchurch reconstruction and sets
the context for the reconstruction of horizontal
infrastructure. This discussion includes a brief
introduction to organizational roles in the
reconstruction. The analysis then moves onto
examining the impact of institutional and
organizational arrangements on decisions. It explores
how the design philosophy changed over time and
how reconstruction effort is scoped at a project level.
It is important to highlight that this paper does not
analyse the appropriateness of the organizational
boundaries, scoping, and prioritization, which will be
considered in future work. Rather, the aim of this
paper is to provide organizational context and explore
the influence this has on the decision-making process.
2. CHRISTCHURCH CONTEXT
2.1. Overview
Christchurch, with a population of approximately
370,000, is the main urban centre in the Canterbury
region of New Zealand. The region was hit by a series
of earthquakes during 2010 and 2011. The first
earthquake occurred in September 2010. Thousands
of aftershocks have followed, including three major
events that occurred in February 2011, June 2011,
and December 2011. Homes were damaged,
Christchurch’s Central Business District was severely
affected, and horizontal infrastructure systems across
the city sustained various levels of service loss. The
February event caused the worst damage.
The Christchurch City Council (CCC) set up the
Infrastructure Rebuild Management Office (IRMO) to
oversee the reconstruction process following the initial
September event. This was formally launched in
February 2011, just prior to the second major
earthquake (CCC, 2011). The IRMO arrangement
involved four lead contractors partnered with design.
Contracts were won through a bidding process, and
each contractor was allocated an area in the city to
reinstate services.
The increased level of damage caused by the
February 2011 earthquake triggered a change in
approach to the reconstruction process. It prompted
the national government to set up the Canterbury
Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) via the
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011,
introducing national-level governance. Alongside this
process, the CCC recognized that the IRMO
arrangement was not suitable for the larger scale of
repair required (Office of the Auditor General (OAG),
2013). Ultimately, the Stronger Christchurch

Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT) was formed as
the joint venture organization to implement the
reconstruction through an Alliance agreement.1 SCIRT
is responsible for reconstructing the horizontal
infrastructure within Christchurch city, reporting to the
New Zealand Transport Authority (NZTA), CCC, and
CERA. Estimates as of 2012 suggest that 528 km of
sewer pipes, 124 km of water mains, and 1,021 km of
roads were damaged (OAG, 2012). The estimate for
delivering SCIRT’s work is NZ $2.496 billion, which is
jointly funded by the New Zealand national
government (through CERA and NZTA) and the CCC
(OAG, 2013).
2.2. Reconstruction of Horizontal Networks: The
Strategy
The Christchurch case presents a useful
demonstration of how the scale of an event affects the
nature of the response. Damage caused in
September 2010 was significant, but CCC retained
authority to manage the reconstruction process. IRMO
operated on a project-by-project basis where
contractors and consultants typically responded to
specific issues as they were identified.
The transition to SCIRT was accompanied by a
transition to a catchment-level approach where design
teams within SCIRT were allocated project areas
based on wastewater network catchments (Figure 1).
This placed greater emphasis on adopting a more
strategic consideration of options for reconstruction
and seeking ways to incorporate resilience to future
earthquakes. For example, structural damage in a
specific location could be placed in the context of the
operation of the catchment network. Assessment of
the wastewater networks included considering
alternative technologies and adjusting the network
layout to replace damaged sections of the existing
low-gradient, gravity-fed system. Stormwater network
analysis included assessing the increased risk of
flooding and the overall capacity of the network, which
required understanding catchment flows. Water
supply and road assessment proceeded primarily on a
street-by-street basis; however, some adjustments
were made for closure of streets in red-zoned land
(red-zoned land is discussed further in Section 3.2.).
3. INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS: IMPACT ON DECISIONS
3.1. Design Philosophy and Specifications
The Alliance agreement sets specific boundaries
around SCIRT’s scope of work. The agreement was
predicated on restoring services to Christchurch,
with the primary objective “To return the
infrastructure networks to a condition that meets the
levels of service prior to the 4 September 2010
1

Please refer to the OAG report for further detail around the
Alliance agreement.
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Figure 1. Reconstruction catchment areas, coloured according to rebuild programme start date. Map sourced from SCIRT data (map dated
July 2013). Prioritization of areas forreconstruction was determined through consideration of multiple factors such as operational priorities,
interdependencies, key services, external factors and other constraints (e.g. resources [SCIRT, n.d. a])

earthquake within the timing constraints of the
rebuild” (CCC, NZTA, & CERA, 2013, p.3). In
essence,
this
meant
replacing
damaged
infrastructure on a like-for-like basis, where
designers apply modern equivalent standards and
materials. A secondary objective established that:
“Where restoration work is undertaken, and where
reasonably possible and economically efficient and
viable, greater resilience is to be incorporated into
the network” (CCC, NZTA & CERA, 2013, p.3). The
definition of resilience is a topical debate in
academic literature (as discussed in Alexander,
2013). From SCIRT’s perspective (and for the
purposes of this discussion), resilience is “the ability
for the infrastructure (the roads, pipes etc.) to resist
future earthquake damage. Improved infrastructure
resilience can be achieved by using better materials,
adopting higher construction standards, creating new
systems, or minimising hazards.” (SCIRT, n.d. b)2 It
proved difficult in some circumstances to justify
improved resilience due to, for example, extra costs
where the extent of a design needs to go beyond a
specific damaged area to meet tie-in requirements,
or the costs of augmenting substandard systems.
Opportunities to make step-change improvements to
the service or capacity of the network are considered
but require approval for extra funding. To date, a

greater proportion of this funding has been allocated
to improving the wastewater network compared to
the storm water network and roads, with some
allocation towards improving bridges.
3.2. Assessment and Design Process
An important aspect of any recovery process is the
ability to change over time in light of new information
(Olshanksy, Johnson, & Topping, 2006). SCIRT’s
strategy initially focused on suburbs with the most
badly damaged wastewater infrastructure, prioritizing
the need to restore this service.3 The prioritization
was determined on the basis of a multicriteria
assessment. Infrastructure Recovery Technical
Standards and Guidelines (IRTS&G) were developed
by SCIRT’s clients to provide a consistent basis on
which to justify restoration decisions. This document
provided a basic framework that, in its early versions,
supported a strategy of intervention at a threshold
level of damage. While the reconstruction was
always fundamentally guided by a principle of
restoring services, the earlier versions of the
IRTS&G had provided a prescriptive approach
focused on fixing structural damage. This was
generally viewed to be appropriate guidance for the
most damaged wastewater networks. Here, the
approach was essentially based on both the extent

2

Other definitions of resilience vary depending on the context.
Even in the context of resilience to natural hazards, the discussion
“ranges from ecological to social systems and also covers some
socio-ecological spaces in-between” (Kuhlicke, 2010, p. 61).

3

Excluding the Central Business District, where demolition works
had to take place before horizontal infrastructure damage could
be adequately assessed and repaired or rebuilt.
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of pipe fracturing and the loss of longitudinal grade,
which can affect the ability of gravity-fed systems to
operate.
As design teams progressively moved into assessing
low to moderately damaged wastewater catchments,
it became clear that adherence to the threshold
damage specifications outlined in the IRTS&G did
not provide entirely suitable guidance for these
areas. This approach was not structured in a way
that encouraged the utilization of the remaining
operational life of moderately damaged assets. As
the focus shifted towards these areas, the basis of
decisions was modified to place more emphasis on
returning a minimum level of network services to the
city. This approach was predicated on the basis that
there is a finite level of available funding where the
confirmed budget was less than early target
estimates (this is discussed in the OAG report
published in 2013). This funding needed to be
allocated in a way that restored pre-earthquake
levels of service from a citywide perspective; a
process requiring trade-offs as to where to invest. In
less damaged areas, there was an option to reduce
reconstruction investment and accept higher levels
of maintenance where the existing infrastructure can
provide a minimum level of service. The increased
maintenance cost is offset by reduced maintenance
requirements of new infrastructure introduced in
other areas.
There had nevertheless always been a mechanism
in the design process at SCIRT to challenge the
guidance of the IRTS&G on any particular project.
This process involved a Scope and Standards (S&S)
committee that reviewed applications from design
teams requesting deviation from the standards
specified in the IRTS&G.4 The shift away from
prescriptive intervention provided greater scope for
engineers to consider alternative options. The
IRTS&G was subsequently amended to provide
better guidance for considering levels of service.
One wastewater project in particular went through
several design reviews, where design engineers
looked for opportunities to pursue better value
solutions because damaged assets still had
significant remaining operational life. An important
aspect here was that most of the original design of
the
existing
wastewater
network
(primarily
constructed in the 1960s) did not meet the minimum
grade specification of current local standards.
SCIRT’s project engineers believed that strict
adherence to the intervention-based design
guidelines in this case would overprescribe
4

All projects required sign-off by technical council staff
representing CCC as asset owner representatives within SCIRT.
The S&S committee is chaired by the CCC, and consists of six
CCC members, one NZTA representative and one CERA
representative.

requirements for repair. A lifecycle cost analysis
suggested that the up-front cost of relaying all
subgrade pipes to more resilient standards (through
steeper grades) was not warranted. The analysis
included the possibility of earthquake damage
occurring. The engineers proposed to relay pipes
that had sustained a series of failures to “bestavailable grade,” rather than to full compliance of the
current standards. This proposal to deviate from
guidelines was initially rejected by the S&S
committee.
However,
as
intervention-based
guidelines were gradually superseded by target
costs for meeting minimum levels of service, this
proposal was reviewed and some deviations were
ultimately accepted.
It was estimated that the total cost of a fully
compliant option for this project (in terms of strictly
following intervention-based guidelines) was $NZ 44
million. The current estimate is NZ $10.9 million. The
current design introduces less resilience into this
catchment area compared to the original proposal.
There is also an element of deferral where pipes not
replaced now will have a shorter asset life than new
pipes and may require earlier replacement. However,
reduced construction costs outweighed the risk of
future damage and subsequent need for repair. In
isolation, this project may be viewed as a lost
opportunity to increase infrastructure resilience
through the use of new materials and through
designing a system with steeper grades. However,
the accepted design makes greater use of the
remaining asset life in the existing network. The
savings made here also allowed for reallocation of
the remaining budget for SCIRT into other areas of
the city’s infrastructure. This is an important factor
where there is limited funding available to
reconstruct the city’s assets.
3.3. Determining Intervention
The assessment process for each network will not
be addressed in this paper. While based on the
same general philosophy, the reconstruction
approach to each network has particular nuances.
Aspects of the storm water network restoration are
discussed below to demonstrate some of the
challenges involved.
The storm water network in Christchurch is defined
through two key components:
•

The primary network, which consists of
underground pipes, sumps, outlet structures,
and stop banks.

•

The secondary network, which is the road
infrastructure—kerbs and channels to direct
surface water flow.

SCIRT is “primarily concerned with the ‘hardengineered’ assets” (CCC, NZTA & CERA, 2013). It
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is within the assessment remit to evaluate increases
in flooding risk. However, in essence, any upgrade in
the system in terms of adding capacity beyond what
existed prior to the earthquake requires sourcing
funding beyond that approved for SCIRT work. Also,
area-wide land settlement and reduced capacity of
waterways impacted the capacity of the storm water
network, but these issues are not directly associated
with damage sustained by the “hard-engineered”
assets.
In practice, it was challenging for storm water
engineers to apply the principle of like-for-like
replacement. Direct replacement of the damaged
pipe network will not necessarily result in restoration
of prior network capacity because changes in land
levels have resulted in loss of hydraulic grade in
some areas. This essentially meant that there is a
reduction in the capacity of the system, as
demonstrated in Figure 2. Where augmenting the
primary system was considered as a practical
intervention for restoring network capacity,
engineers, asset owners, and funders had varying
views on what level of repair was justified through
the intervention-level guidance, what constitutes
added resilience, and whether or not there was a
need to source extra funding beyond that approved
for SCIRT.
A significant amount of land in the eastern suburbs is
at risk of flooding. This was outlined in a recent
report on climate change risk for the CCC by Tonkin
and Taylor (2013) and was substantiated in a 48hour storm event in March 2014. Flooding was a
prior risk that has been exacerbated by land
movement associated with the earthquakes.
In one SCIRT storm water project, a new storm
water retention basin was proposed to restore a
minimum level of drainage capacity to an area where
no basin had previously existed. Reduction in land
height in the area significantly reduced the hydraulic
capacity of the primary network that existed prior to
the earthquakes. The network relied on a storm
water outfall in a tidal environment. The system is
now more vulnerable to impact from high tide levels
due to land settlement, and the capacity for storm
water discharge is reduced (similar to the situation
outlined in Figure 2). This was a case where a
significant increase in risk of flooding attributable to
earthquake damage justified augmenting the existing
system with a storm water basin. There was also,
fortuitously, reserve land in the area that could be
made available for this purpose.
In other areas, it was difficult to justify intervention to
restore existing networks according to modern
capacity standards. Issues associated with lack of
capacity were as much associated with historical
shortcomings of the network as they were a

dh

dh

Figure 2. Conceptual sketch of longitudinal pipe and section with
a tide-affected outflow. The top section shows the pre-earthquake
situation. The change in hydraulic head (indicated by “dh”) is
reduced in the lower section as a result of land movement caused
by earthquakes. This reduces the capacity of the storm water
system to drain in low-lying land, particularly during high tides.

consequence of earthquake damage. The cost to
improve the system could not be justified under
SCIRT funding.
An additional complicating factor for designing
effective infrastructure solutions is the uncertainty
around the future use of red-zoned land in the city.
Land was zoned red in areas that sustained high
levels of damage, had a high risk of future
earthquake or flood damage, and where it is
considered uneconomical to repair properties (OAG,
2012). Much of this land area borders the Avon
River. (refer back to Figure 1 to see the relative
extent of red zone areas). In some places, this land
was in areas that are potentially suitable for locating
storm water retention basins. While SCIRT could
make recommendations to CERA, it has no authority
to influence decisions regarding red-zoned land.
Now, over three years since the February 2011
earthquake, there is still no clear picture about the
future of the red zone, which is both a highly political
and a complex insurance issue. The reconstruction
of horizontal infrastructure has moved ahead in the
absence of clarity here. As a general rule, building
any infrastructure in red-zoned land has been
avoided to date unless it has involved maintaining
existing connections to service green-zoned land.
4. DISCUSSION
This paper examined the decision-making processes
guiding postdisaster reconstruction of horizontal
infrastructure. It has highlighted unique challenges
that the postdisaster context poses for design and
delivery processes. The Christchurch case study
demonstrates the importance of maintaining a flexible
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approach during the course of the recovery period.
The response associated with earlier phases of the
recovery was adjusted as needs changed over time. A
twofold change in philosophy throughout the recovery
effort provided greater allowance for using
engineering judgment and applying more strategic
thinking. This was demonstrated here primarily in the
context of reconstructing the wastewater network
which was significantly impacted by the changes. This
first change is attributed to the move from IRMO
location-based repairs to SCIRT catchment
performance assessment. The second change was in
the adjustment of repair philosophy away from
prescriptive guidelines to attaining a minimum
citywide level of service. This gave more emphasis on
understanding the remaining asset life and
maintenance costs of infrastructure assets in an effort
to achieve a more effective distribution of available
funding.
This paper also outlined the challenges associated
with restoring infrastructure services to predisaster
levels and in attempting to capitalise on opportunities
to improve the network. A key part of the challenge is
in determining the actual loss of network capacity
attributable to the earthquakes. Costs of augmenting
existing networks had to be justified on a like-for-like
basis, which is often not a clear-cut evaluation. While
there is ostensibly an opportunity to introduce
improvements as part of the reconstruction process,
capacity upgrades will generally entail extra costs,
and this cannot always be accommodated within the
available funds. Finally, uncertainty over future land
use limits holistic decision making for the horizontal
infrastructure reconstruction task.
5. CONCLUSION
The question that underlies a significant amount of
existing research into postdisaster reconstruction is
essentially: what is the best way to facilitate the
reconstruction process? The Christchurch case
provides some insight into how decisions related to
reconstructing horizontal infrastructure are made.
Firstly, while taking the opportunity to improve
networks and increase resilience are commendable
ambitions, a lot of work and time was required to
create a common understanding amongst the funders
(CCC, NZTA, and CERA) and implementers (SCIRT)
as to what this actually means in reality. Secondly, an
understanding of requirements developed through
time as those managing the reconstruction developed
a more tangible sense of the nature of damage,
possible repair options, cost of work, and available
funding. Thirdly, SCIRT was able to react to changing
conditions throughout the reconstruction process.
However, it did so within the bounds of the Alliance
agreement. Delivering on this agreement meant
making decisions without certainty on related
reconstruction issues outside of SCIRT’s remit.
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